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Abstract The manufacturing sectors in Latin America have been more affected by
the currency over/undervaluation than their counterpart in industrialized economies.
From a panel data set covering 39 countries and 22 manufacturing sectors (2-digit)
within 1995–2008, we formally test the hypothesis that there exists a Latin
American effect and then investigate the possible reasons for this distinguished
pattern. The use of a disaggregated data is an important feature of our empirical
strategy: the undervaluation index (main covariate) is less likely to be determined
by the growth rate of a specific manufacturing sector, partially addressing the
specification problem that plagues standard cross-country regressions. We then
explore the within sector–country variation to study the relationship between cur-
rency over/undervaluation and manufacturing sectors growth. We find that the
import content of exports might be an important driver of this result at a sectoral
level. At a macro-level, the openness and the income per capita of a country are
important factors.
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1 Introduction
After World War II most large Latin American countries chose import substitution
industrialization (ISI) as their main economic development strategy. Their
policymakers accepted the Prebisch/ECLA analysis, which took a pessimistic view
of the future world demand for their traditional primary exports and recommended
ISI as the solution to their quest for economic growth and development. They closed
their economies (using various protective measures), encouraged foreign direct
investments through various incentive schemes, pursued inflationary public
investment policies to allocate resources in priority sectors, and kept their exchange
rates fixed. These measures gradually resulted in an overvalued exchange rate,
causing severe balance of payments difficulties, which, after a period of speculation
against the currency, usually led to devaluation.
By the first decade of the twenty-first century the situation of these countries had
changed substantially. In the 1990s they had adopted neoliberal policies, which
consisted of the opening of their economies (drastically reducing the ISI protective
walls), massive privatization of state enterprises, effective stabilization policies
which ended the hyperinflations of the 1970s and 1980s, and the opening of many
sectors from which foreign investors had been excluded. Most countries central
banks adopted an inflation targeting policy, whose principal instrument to control
prices, was a high real rate of interest which was considerably higher than the rate of
interest which prevailed in many industrial countries. All this was taking place
while China and other Asian economies were undergoing an industrial boom, which
greatly increased the demand for minerals and food. The resulting higher
commodity prices dramatically raised export earnings of Latin American countries.
Thus, by the second half of the first decade of the twenty-first century, these Latin
American countries were in a paradoxical situation. Their currencies were
appreciating relative to the US dollar and the Euro as a result of both large capital
inflows (due to the high relative interest rates) and trade surpluses due the high
prices of commodities, which they exported to Asia. Appreciation, however, was
said to be threatening the industrial sectors which had been built up since the mid-
twentieth century, by both making Latin American manufactured goods less
competitive internationally and by increasing imports of foreign manufactured
goods which were getting cheaper. Some economists have been calling this a
situation which threatened to de-industrialize Latin America.
Table 1 provides some economic indicators of major Latin American economies
during the period 2001–2009. As can be noted, they all experienced currency
appreciation, increased of net foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as an increase
(in absolute value) of net resource transfer. Structurally, most had a high interest
rate and positive net FDI during the period.
Surprisingly, it would seem that both situations—the ISI experience and the
neoliberal experience—resulted in an overvalued exchange rate. In the former, the
combination of protection, fixed exchange rate and inflation led to overvaluation;
this usually led to a balance of payments crisis, speculation against the currency,
and, finally, devaluation. In the case of the neo-liberal economies of the first decade
of the twenty-first century, a combination of high interest rates, an open economy
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and capital inflows resulted in appreciating (and overvaluing) the currency. As far as
exports of commodities are concerned, in the ISI period their prices were weakened
due to the low growth of demand (see the Prebisch analysis), while during the
neoliberal period, with the strong growth of Asian demand, their prices were rising
as exports grew. As the impact of the ISI has been widely studied, we shall focus on
the neo-liberal experience.1
1.1 The Rodrik vision
It is interesting to contrast the recent Latin American experience in the first decade
of the twenty-first century with the vision of Dani Rodrik, who in a recent study
came to the conclusion that ‘‘...Avoiding significant overvaluation of the currency is
one of the most robust imperatives that can be gleaned from the diverse experience
with economic growth around the world, and one that appears to be strongly
supported by cross-country statistical evidence.‘‘ (Rodrik 2008, p. 365). And further
on he states that ‘‘...Just as overvaluation hurts growth, so undervaluation facilitates
it.’’ (Rodrink 2008, p. 366). However, he notes that ‘‘...this relationship holds only
for developing countries; it disappears when the same is restricted to richer
countries, and it gets stronger the poorer the country.’’ (p. 366).
For South America, with primary commodity booms and high interest rates
attracting huge inflows of speculative capital, appreciation may have made most of
its manufactured products less internationally competitive. In some cases cheaper
manufactured imports may have been partially controlled through the countervailing
effect of stimulated demand for domestic manufactured goods through temporary
sales tax cuts (as happened in Brazil in 2011–2012, or in some cases through the
lower costs of imported intermediate goods). The final effect of such appreciation in
the industrial sector remains therefore inconclusive.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of currency over/undervaluation
on manufacturing production in Latin America in the 1995–2008 period through
cross-country cross-sector regressions. We shall follow the same structure as in
Rodrik (2008). However, our approach is different, as we are dealing directly with a
disaggregated industrial sector in order to reveal the Latin American effect. The
hypothesis that Latin America has been more strongly affected by currency
overvaluation is investigated by controlling for country and sector characteristics
and fixed effects, which will allow us to shed some light on the reasons behind the
stronger Latin American effect.
2 Empirical evidence
There is some consensus that the real exchange rate matters for economic growth.
According to Rodrik (2008), undervaluation of the currency stimulates economic
growth and is more likely to be effective for developing countries. Rodrik’s
1 See Baer (1964, 1972, 1984 and 2014) and Little et al. (1970).
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argument is based on a panel data set in which growth is explained among other
variables by an index of undervaluation.
The index of undervaluation, the main covariate in the model, is a measure of
domestic price level adjusted for the Balassa–Samuelson effect.2 The index is
computed in three steps: first, by calculating the real exchange rate (RER) through
the purchasing power parity conversion factor (PPP); second, by regressing the RER
on per capita GDP we obtain the estimated Balassa–Samuelson effect; finally, the
undervaluation index is obtained by the ratio of the real exchange rate to the
predicted value from the second step, i.e., the Balassa–Samuelson-adjusted rate.
Whenever the undervaluation index exceeds one, the currency is considered
undervalued. Fortunately, as an index it allows comparisons across countries and
over time.
Given this measure of under or overvaluation, Rodrik’s goal was to find evidence
of a positive relationship between growth and undervaluation. From a sample of 188
countries and 11 five-year periods from 1950 to 2004, the baseline specification
form is:
growthit ¼aþ b ln RGDPCHi;t1 þ d1 ln UNDERVALit
þ d2 ln RGDPCHi;t1  lnUNDERVALi;t þ f i þ ft þ uit
ð1Þ
where the dependent variable, annual growth in GDP per capita, is explained by
initial real income per capita, RGDPCHI,t-1, the undervaluation index, the inter-
action between them and the country and time dummies.
The result suggests that currency undervaluation affects growth rates positively
except in the case of ‘‘anomalous‘‘ Latin American economies. The effect depends
on the initial level of income per capita and is stronger for the sample of developing
countries. Based on this evidence, Rodrik named the Mexican case, where the
undervaluation is negatively related to growth, as the ‘‘anomalous Latin American
case’’. Nevertheless, as shown in Fig. 1, by verifying in an analogous manner the
situation of other major Latin American economies (such as Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia and Peru) one could conclude that the Mexican case is not an
exception within Latin America context. One could claim that the primary
commodity booms are confounding the effect of exchange rate variations since it
might be causing both appreciation and GDP growth. We therefore propose a
different empirical strategy in order to verify to what extent the industrial sectors in
Latin America have been negatively or positively affected by the recent currency
appreciation episodes: a cross-country cross-sector analysis within 1995-2008.
Regarding sectorial effects, one can highlight four ways in which the real
exchange rate appreciation could affect manufacturing sectors performance. First,
the real appreciation of the currency makes manufactured goods more expensive
internationally, thus reducing their international competitiveness. Second, imported
manufactured goods become cheaper, challenging the domestic industrial sector. On
the other hand, appreciation could also benefit the manufacturing sector. An
2 The ‘‘Balassa–Samuelson’’ effect was formulated by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). It describes
the distortion in purchasing power parity (PPP) resulting from the international differences in relative
productivity between the tradable goods sector and the non-tradable goods sector.
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overvalued currency makes imported intermediate goods cheaper, reducing
production cost, which may affect investment decisions, as well as the price
competitiveness of the industrial sector in the domestic and international market.
Furthermore, if such appreciation is due to an increasing demand of primary
commodities, the income effect may raise the domestic consumption of manufac-
tured goods.3 It is thus necessary to carefully check which one of the four effects has
prevailed in Latin America in the last decades. An industrial sector-level analysis
turns out to be a reasonable way to investigate it, conditional on the heterogeneous
characteristics of each country and sector.
3 The data and econometric model
3.1 Identification strategy
Recent empirical studies have tried to identify the currency under/overvaluation
effects on economic growth by running cross-country regressions from panel sets
with the country output growth as the explained variable and the exchange rate or an
undervaluation index as one of the covariates in the model.4 The authors
acknowledge some known identification problems, such as the multicausality
between growth and the exchange rate as well as the possibility of a third factor
affecting both growth and the exchange rate. Although applying GMM techniques
have been the common treatment to these problems, a disaggregated sectorial
analysis could identify its effect through a more direct and cleaner manner.
The use of a longitudinal dataset representing the industrial sectors for different
countries and years allows a better identification.5 First, as highlighted by
Eichengreen (2008), it is most unlikely that the output of a specific industrial
sector will be determining the exchange rate. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of
output share of each sector relative to the countries total manufacturing production;
on average each sector studied here represents a small share of the country’s total
manufacturing production, mostly concentrated below 10 %. Second, considering
the heterogeneity across sectors, the model allows controlling for sectorial
characteristics. As mentioned before, we should expect that some sectorial features
would determine the heterogeneous effect of currency under or overvaluation on
their output growth. Third, one could argue that by checking the effects on the
3 According to Shafaeddin (2005), during the 1990s the import intensity of the industrial sector of Chile,
Colombia, Peru and Brazil increased. This can be considered evidence of the positive effects which could
arise from currency appreciation in these countries.
4 See Rodrik (2008), Gala (2008) and Berg and Miao (2010).
5 Berg and Miao (2010) and Rajan and Subramanian (2011) provide some support for this empirical
strategy. In the first, the authors claim that ‘‘understanding the role of the real exchange rate for growth
will probably require stepping away from the aggregate growth-regression framework employed here
[cross-country regressions], in particular looking at more disaggregated evidence to see which channels
are operating and perhaps to disentangle causality’’. In the latter, it was considered the key innovation of
their paper, which ‘‘by absorbing country-specific variation in country indicators, and exploiting only the
within-country across-industry variation, we go some way in addressing the specification problem that
plague standard cross-country regressions’’.
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manufacturing sector directly, we substantially reduce the effects arising from the
demand boom of primary commodities, which could be causing the spurious
correlation previously described between national growth and currency appreciation
in the case of Latin American economies.
3.2 The data
The models are estimated using unbalanced panel data covering 1995-2008 on a
sample of 39 countries, including 8 Latin American and 31 Industrialized
economies, built .6 For each country the data cover 22 industrial sectors arranged
at the 2-digit level of the International Standard Industrial Classification of all
economic activities (ISIC) revision 3. The sectorial data are obtained by
INDSTAT2, from United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO),
which is the largest industrial statistics database of its kind. Rajan and Zingales
(1998), Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) and Imbs (2007) are good reference on the use of
UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database.
The data were based on three different sources. From UNIDO we obtained the
dependent variable, which is the average annual growth rate of production in sector
‘‘s‘‘ in country ‘‘c’’.7 The intermediate import ratio and the import content of exports
Fig. 2 Sector/country output share in the country
6 LA countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay. Other
industrialized countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States of America.
7 The real output growth is obtained through the production index multiplied by the output in current
dollars at 2000, the year by which the indexes are normalized to.
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were obtained from the OECD STAN input–output database, unfortunately they
were not available on an yearly basis. We therefore used it as a time-invariant
characteristic though it varies across countries and sectors.8 The Penn World Tables
Aten et al. (2011) were used to get country controls: real GDP per capita
(RGDPCH), openness (OpenK), real consumption and real investment share of GDP
(Kc and Ki) as well as the real exchange rate, which was obtained through the
purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factor. The summary statistics, in
Table 2, describe these variables for our sample.
As in Imbs (2007), the number of sectors in each country remains constant over
time, but varies across countries. We kept sectors with at least 5 years of
consecutive information. The remaining missing value in the data are assumed to be
random since its pattern does not seem to be related to the specific situation of each
sector or country.9
3.3 The baseline model
Our baseline model was constructed to capture the effect of currency under/
overvaluation on the output growth rates of several manufacturing sectors in
different countries and then test the hypothesis of the Latin American effect. We
model it similar to Rodrik (2008) to make it comparable to the current literature on
the topic. Thus, the model we want to estimate is:
growthcs;t ¼aþ b1 ln ycs;t1 þ b2 ln RGDPCHc;t þ d1 ln UNDERVALc;t
þ d2LA  UNDERVALc;t þ fcs þ ft þ ucs;t
ð2Þ
where, for country c, sector s and year t: the dependent variable, annual growth in
production per capita, growthcst, is explained by initial production per capita, ycs,t-1;
the country’s real income per capita, RGDPCH; the undervaluation index, Under-
val, and its interaction with a dummy for Latin American countries, LA; plus
country–sector and time dummies, to account for time invariant country–sector
unobserved features. The Haussman–Taylor test suggests the use of country–sector
fixed effects rather than random effects.10
Table 3 shows the result of the baseline model estimation without country and
sector controls. As in Rodrik (2008), the undervaluation index is positively
correlated to sector output growth and statistically significant. If the currency is on
average undervalued for an year, i.e., the index is greater than one, the growth rate
of production is on average positively affected. As we should expect the sectorial
8 In the case of Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay, we used the mean for LA since the information
was not available.
9 Regarding the possible relationship between country controls and missing observations, a logit
regression of missing values for our dependent variable on country controls supports the absence of such a
relationship. Variations of real GDP per capita does not change the likelihood of a country to conceal
information about their manufacturing sector.
10 We are implicitly assuming identical responses of annual growth of manufacturing sectors production
to covariates such as Real GDP per capita (RGDPCH). We tested alternative formulations, which would
allow for some heterogeneous effect within sectors or countries, however the estimated effect of
undervaluation was not really sensitive to these modifications.
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output growth is highly correlated to the economy’s overall performance, measured
here by real income per capita. We highlight the result found when including the
interaction with a dummy for LA countries: manufacturing sectors in LA have been
more affected by the currency variations than their counterpart placed on
industrialized countries. We then investigate some possible reasons for that result.
Formally speaking, we go through the following steps: (1) add more country
controls and check whether or not the result holds; (2) interact the undervaluation
index with Country and sector characteristics to check what could be driving the
result; (3) discuss the effect at a sectorial level and check whether the composition
of manufacturing sectors is in favor of industrialized countries.
3.4 Expanding the baseline model
We decided to include more time-varying country controls in order to verify
whether or not the Latin American Effect still holds. As shown in Table 4, even
including some new country controls which are also related to exchange rate
appreciation, such as the degree of openness, real private consumption and
investment shares, the effect still holds.
Table 5 presents the result of the interaction of country and sector characteristics
with the undervaluation index. At a macro-level, the initial income per capita of a
country as well as its openness defines the effect of currency over or undervaluation.
One may interpret it as: the richer the country, the lower the effect of real exchange
rate variation on its manufacturing sectors. Moreover, the greater the openness the
more exposed these sectors are to such variations. Since the average income per
capita of Latin American countries in our samples is US$8,295 against US$ 26,318
for industrialized countries, it might be an important factor explaining the Latin
American effect. The result resembles the Rodrik findings and could be used to
explain the Latin American distinction.
Nonetheless, we should still investigate what characteristics of this early stage of
development are driving the result. The openness could work the other way around.
Latin American countries are known for their protectionist policies and the overall
degree of openness is low when compared to industrialized countries in our sample,
though it seems not strong enough to offset the other forces driving the Latin
American effect.
At a micro level, the import content of exports seems to be an important
ingredient. Intuitively, sectors presenting a higher ratio will be facing a reduction in
cost whenever the national currency is overvalued and therefore alleviates the
negative effect caused by the overvaluation. For the Latin American countries
studied in this paper (see Table 6), the import content of manufacturing sectors is on
average lower than in industrialized countries and the differences are particularly
accentuated in some sectors.
3.5 Breaking down the effect by sectors
To exploit the sector-specific effect of the real exchange rate, we allow for the
interaction between movements of our undervaluation index and a dummy variable
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for each sector. It permits different slopes among sectors, besides their fixed effect.
Formally speaking, we want to estimate the following model:
growthcs;t ¼aþ b1lnycs;t1 þ b2 ln RGDPCHc;t þ b3Xct þ d1 ln UNDERVALct






The estimation results are shown in Table 6. As we should expect, we do find
some heterogeneity when we allow the Latin American effect to vary across
manufacturing sectors. Though the causes of such heterogeneity demand a deeper
study of each industry, accounting for their particularities, we will show the extent
of such heterogeneity and try to make some connection with our previous findings.
Our result points to the import content of exports as an important factor on the
sectorial level in explaining the heterogeneous effect of real exchange rate over or
undervaluation on the performance of manufacturing sectors. By disaggregating the
Latin American effect we can find some regularities related to that feature: (1)
motor vehicles and other transport equipment (Isic 34 and 35) are the most sensitive
to changes in the undervaluation index and both present low import ratio and import
content of exports when compared to their counterpart in the sample of
industrialized countries. (2) The sectors highly dependent on the imports of
intermediate goods and with imports content of exports similar to the ones in
industrialized economies presented a negative coefficient for the undervaluation
index.11 In these cases, the currency overvaluation causes a nominal cost reduction
which may offset the Latin American effect or even increase their growth rate of
production rather than decrease it.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we tested the hypothesis that manufacturing sectors in Latin American
countries have been more affected by currency over or undervaluation than those
placed in other industrialized countries in the 1995–2008 period. We controlled for
sector and country characteristics to check for some possible explanations. The final
goal was to make the result comparable to Rodrik (2008), in which the relationship
between undervaluation and growth were drawn from cross-country analysis and, as
a result, the effect on the manufacturing sector could not be inferred directly and the
Latin American countries presented an anomalous pattern.
We conclude that manufacturing sectors in Latin America on average have been
more affected by currency over or undervaluation. As found by Rodrik (2008), in
this paper we ratify the importance of income per capita in determining its effect.
11 See Isic 30–32. The Isic 16—Tobacco products also present a negative effect that goes against the
Latin American effect, but it presents a low Intermediate import ratio and low import content of exports.
For this industry a investigation that goes beyond the scope of this paper is needed.
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Indeed, the stage of development could partially explain the difference found
between sectors in Latin America and in industrialized economies. Nonetheless, we
found that the degree of openness of a country as well as the sectorial import content
of exports could be also important elements in explaining the distinct effect of real
exchange rate movements on the production growth of industrial sectors. On
average, manufacturing sectors in Latin America import fewer inputs and their
exports have a high domestic content. Our result suggests that these sectorial
features play an important role in explaining the sensitiveness of Latin American
manufacturing sectors to currency over/undervaluation.
By disaggregating the Latin American effect among sectors, we provided a
picture of which sectors have been most affected and used our previous findings to
shed some light on the reasons for such heterogeneity. As a result, we found that
sectors built during the ISI period such as, motor vehicles and other transport
equipments, have been more affected than the average in Latin America, which
might be explained by the low import content of their exports. The other sectors,
such as IT, computing machinery and communication equipment, besides their
small share, have presented the intermediate import ratio and the import content of
export as high as in the manufacturing sectors of industrialized countries. The high
dependence on imports, typical of these sectors, seems to affect the way they
respond to currency appreciation/depreciation. In the case of the computing
machinery, for instance, a currency overvaluation will likely increase the growth
rate of production due to the reduced cost of imported inputs.
For policy purposes, our result seems to go along with Rodrik (2008)’s evaluation
that an undervalued currency can be seen as a growth strategy. In the case of Latin
American countries, the effect of such undervaluation could be even stronger;
however, the quality of the growth could be questioned since it would be also more
responsive to real exchange rate movements. These findings support the idea that
the protectionist policies adopted in Latin America, aiming to help building the
domestic industry by controlling the imports of some intermediate inputs, has a cost
that we have been calling the Latin American effect.
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See appendix Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
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Table 2 Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Industrialized countries
Growth rate of production per capita 7,704 -0.0006 0.2450 -12.2270 0.8921
Ln underval 7,704 0.013 0.201 -0.508 0.662
Real Income per capita (Rgdpch) 7,704 26,318.53 11,923.58 5,480.58 8,6064.90
Openness in constant prices (Openk) 7,704 98.91 68.71 1.77 443.18
Consumption share of real GDP (Kc) 7,704 65.09 12.40 32.43 161.24
Investment share of real GDP (Ki) 7,704 23.27 6.81 -33.14 47.79
Intermediate import ratio 7,691 0.45 0.24 0.02 1.00
Import content of exports 7,691 0.37 0.30 0.08 6.63
Latin American countries
Growth rate of production per capita 1,888 0.0008 0.1724 -2.0286 0.6855
Ln underval 1,888 -0.183 0.212 -0.712 0.241
Real income per capita (Rgdpch) 1,888 8,295.22 2,147.81 4,668.40 1,2751.51
Openness in constant prices (Openk) 1,888 42.47 15.32 18.11 82.18
Consumption share of real GDP (Kc) 1,888 71.58 4.78 60.19 77.75
Investment share of real GDP (Ki) 1,888 21.95 3.70 11.99 32.92
Intermediate import ratio 1,888 0.29 0.20 0.02 0.93
Import content of exports 1,888 0.22 0.11 0.06 0.72
Table 3 Baseline model: regression estimates
(1) (2)
Ln Initial production per capita -0.111*** -0.110***
(0.0207) (0.0208)
Ln underval 0.134*** 0.0895***
(0.0206) (0.0274)
Ln RGDPCH 0.364*** 0.362***
(0.0434) (0.0434)
LA9 Ln underval 0.0804**
(0.0331)
Sector–country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 9,592 9,592
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p \ 0.10, ** p \ 0.05, *** p \ 0.01
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Table 4 Baseline model plus country controls: regression estimates
(1) (2)
Ln initial production per capita -0.110*** (0.0208) -0.114*** (0.0225)
Ln underval 0.0840*** (0.0280) 0.0792** (0.0326)
LA9 underval 0.0869** (0.0338) 0.0962*** (0.0364)
Ln RGDPCH 0.358*** (0.0437) 0.290*** (0.0472)
Ln Openk (openness in constant prices) -0.0367*** (0.0121)
Ln Kc (consumption share of real GDP) 0.0125 (0.0282)
Ln Ki (Investment share of real GDP) 0.0857*** (0.0162)
Sector–country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 9,552 9,552
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p \ 0.10, ** p \ 0.05, *** p \ 0.01
Table 5 Baseline model under different interactions terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln initial production -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.115***
per capita (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0229) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0226)
Ln underval 0.0792** 0.199*** 0.179** 0.0979*** 0.172*** 0.193***
(0.0326) (0.0303) (0.0740) (0.0261) (0.0320) (0.0302)
LA9 underval 0.0962***
(0.0364)
Ln underval X -0.00417***
RGDPCHt-1 (0.00144)
Ln underval X -0.0619
kct-1 (0.118)
Ln underval X 0.0818***
openkt-1 (0.0281)
Ln underval X -0.112
Interm. imp. ratio (0.0899)
Ln underval X -0.214**
Imp. content of Exp (0.101)
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector–Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,552 9,552 9,552 9,552 9,539 9,539
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p \ 0.10, ** p \ 0.05, *** p \ 0.01
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22 Printing and publishing 0.0154** 0.18 0.27 0.20 0.29
23 Coke, refined petroleum products,nuclear fuel -0.0547*** 0.16 0.35 0.28 0.60
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0.00586*** 0.38 0.62 0.23 0.38
25 Rubber and plastics products -0.0302*** 0.31 0.45 0.29 0.38
26 Nonmetallic mineral products 0.0927*** 0.11 0.25 0.13 0.26
27 Basic metals 0.0822*** 0.27 0.52 0.21 0.41
28 Fabricated metal products 0.0806*** 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.33
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.125*** 0.50 0.57 0.26 0.35
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery -0.343*** 0.80 0.77 0.49 0.48
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus -0.0255** 0.60 0.59 0.29 0.41
32 Radio, television and communication equipment -0.143*** 0.69 0.70 0.33 0.65
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.0904*** 0.27 0.65 0.15 0.38
34 Motor vehicles, trailers, semitrailers 0.184*** 0.46 0.64 0.33 0.45
35 Other transport equipment 0.242*** 0.29 0.51 0.19 0.36





Error term clustered by sector
* p \ 0.10, ** p \ 0.05, *** p \ 0.01
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